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Implications of Mill's Theory of Liberty
for the Regulation of Hate Speech and
Hate Crimes
KEITH N. HYLTON
The notion that utilitarianism cannot support a theory of fundamental
rights is a recurring source of conflict in law and philosophy.' Those who
adhere to this view argue that a utilitarian or consequentialist approach cannot
provide a stable, permanent justification for rights: at any moment, the
utilitarian calculus might conclude that what it considered a right yesterday,
actually reduces total welfare, and therefore is not a right today. Perhaps no
one has gone further in attempting to refute this claim than John Stuart Mill.'
As a result, any effort to construct a consequentialist theory of fundamental
rights must draw at least partially on Mill's work.
In this Article, I rely on Mill's theory of liberty to construct a
consequentialist argument to regulate "hate speech,"' hate crimes, and other
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1. See, for example, Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, NY Rev Books 23
(Dec 17, 1970); H.L.A. Hart, Essays on Bentham: Studies in Jurisprudence and Political
Theory 79-104 (Oxford, 1982).
2. John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, (Hackett, 1978) (Elizabeth Rappaport, ed); John Stu-
art Mill, Utilitarianism (Hackett, 1979) (George Sher, ed).
3. I define "hate speech" as speech that aims to arouse anger, resentment, or fear in
an individual because of the individual's race, ethnic group, religion, or political affiliation.
See Richard Delgado, Words that Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets and
Name-Calling, 17 Harv CR-CL L Rev 133 (1982); Mari Matsuda, Public Response to
Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 Mich L Rev 2320 (1989); Calvin R.
Massey, Hate Speech, Cultural Diversity, and the Foundational Paradigms of Free Ex-
pression, 40 UCLA L Rev 103 (1992); Burt Neuborne, Ghosts in the Attic: Idealized
Pluralism, Community, and Hate Speech, 27 Harv CR-CL L Rev 371 (1992); Thomas W.
Simon, Fighting Racism: Hate Speech Detours, 26 Ind L Rev 411 (1993); Nomi Maya
Stolzenberg, "He Drew a Circle that Shut Me Out": Assimilation, Indoctrination, and the
Paradox of a Liberal Education, 106 Harv L Rev 581 (1993); Symposium, Critical Race
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conduct where an individual's actions are motivated by racial, ethnic, religious
or political animosity. I compare current free speech doctrine with the frame-
work to regulate free speech suggested by Mill's theory, and I argue that Mill's
theory provides a more coherent explanation of prominent decisions in this
area than many versions of free speech theory currently advanced by first
amendment scholars.' However, Mill's framework is inconsistent with the
Supreme Court's rhetoric in its most recent hate speech decision, R.A.V. v City
of St. Paul.'
Ultimately, Mill's theory implies that it is socially desirable to regulate hate
speech, but only if that speech violates an existing criminal code provision,
such as a provision governing harassment. Thus, under Mill's theory, regu-
lating hate speech would involve nothing more than enacting a scheme of
penalty-enhancements for hate-motivated speech and conduct.
I. Mill's Theory of Liberty and Implications for Regulation of Speech
and Speech-Related Conduct
Mill's theory is concerned with the line between the state and the individu-
al; more precisely, the things government should be allowed to regulate. My
focus, here, is on the segment of Mill's theory that concerns how government
regulates speech and the distinction between speech and conduct. Mill dis-
cussed how government ought to regulate speech in considerable detail, but he
said very little about the grey area of speech-related conduct. My goal is to
present Mill's theory and discuss what it implies about how government
regulates speech and speech-related conduct.
Mill's argument for free speech consists of two core propositions. First,
free speech is necessary because it exposes false ideas. According to Mill, we
do not know what is "the truth"; instead, at any moment, we labor under a
series of hypotheses about what might be the truth. We ultimately accept a
given hypothesis as true only because we have not seen evidence that it is
false. Free speech is necessary because it makes it easier to prove that a
hypothesis is false and therefore more likely that a false hypothesis will be
exposed.
By using the word "false" I may have already conveyed an incorrect
interpretation of Mill's argument. There is no such thing in Mill's view as a
Theory: Essays on Hate Speech, 82 Cal L Rev 847 (1994); Henry Louis Gates, Jr., et al,
Speaking of Race, Speaking of Sex: Hate Speech, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties (NYU,
1994); Edward J. Cleary, Beyond the Burning Cross: The First Amendment and the
Landmark R.A.V. Case (Random House, 1994). On the constitutionality of hate speech
regulation, see Akhil Reed Amar, The Case of the Missing Amendments: R.A.V. v. City
of St. Paul, 106 Harv L Rev 124 (1992); Murray Dry, Hate Speech and the Constitution,
11 Const Comm 501 (1994-95); Symposium, Hate Speech After R.A.V.: More Conflict
Between Free Speech and Equality?, 18 Wm Mitchell L Rev 889 (1992).
4. For a discussion of the versions of free speech theory, see Martin H. Redish,
Freedom of Expression: A Critical Analysis 9-86 (Michie, 1984).
5. R.A.V. v City of St. Paul, 505 US 377 (1992).
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viewpoint that is absolutely correct. 6 His notion of falsehood is more compli-
cated. A theory may be proven "false" in the sense that it is inconsistent with
a given set of facts, but the facts themselves may be unusual or "outliers."
More fundamentally, the theories we accept as true may, at any moment, be
false. That is, as long as we are clear that "the truth" is conditioned on the
information available at the moment, and that it is always possible a hypothe-
sis will be proven false, discovery of "the truth" is outside of our reach. We
can only compare competing hypotheses, and choose one over the other
because it seems to provide a better description 6f the world. Under this
approach, we rank sets of hypotheses such that a superior hypothesis set is
one that explains all of the events explained by an inferior set as well as
additional events that are inconsistent with the inferior set.'
It follows that it is impossible to separate the notions of truth and
falsifiability.s Truth is simply a transitional phase in which we have accepted
one set of hypotheses over another. As events unfold, generating new informa-
tion, we will eventually accept a different set of hypotheses. Since we cannot
prove a hypotheses set false without freedom to express competing ideas, truth
itself thus becomes a function of the extent to which we can freely express'
ideas. If government restrains expression, we will hold on to inferior hypothe-
ses sets out of ignorance.
Mill's second argument for free expression is that it fosters a society with
diverse points of view. In such a society, competing hypotheses conflict with
one another and, as a result, ultimately increase society's knowledge.9 Further,
just as genetic variation contributes to the ability of a species to survive
random shifts in its environment, variation in beliefs prevents society from
uniformly adopting a lifestyle which is defective with respect to its environ-
ment. Instead, by having diverse points of view, a society is capable of
6. See, for example, Isaiah Berlin, Four Essays On Liberty 188 (Oxford, 1969)
("[Mill's argument assumes] that human knowledge was in principle never complete, and
always fallible.").
7. A more careful statement is this: a superior hypothesis set is one that has not been
rejected as inconsistent with the information available at the moment.
8. Mill, On Liberty at 18 (cited in note 2) ("Complete liberty of contradicting and
disproving our opinion is the very condition which justifies us in assuming its truth for
purposes of action; and on no other terms can a being with human faculties have any
rational assurance of being right."). It is important to note that Mill's argument differs
from the "market-place of ideas" defense of free speech. According to that theory, truth
prevails in the same way that good products prevail over inferior products. See Redish,
Freedom of Expression 45-48 (cited in note 4). Mill does not make this argument, and
seems to regard it with skepticism. See Mill, On Liberty at 27 (cited in note 2) ("the dic-
tum that truth always triumphs over persecution is one of those pleasant falsehoods . . .
9. The notion that knowledge increases through the collision of competing hypotheses
runs throughout Mill's argument. Mill, On Liberty at 16 (cited in note 2) ("If the opinion
is right, they are deprived of the opportunity of exchanging error for truth; if wrong, they
lose, what is almost as great a benefit, the clearer perception and livelier impression of
truth produced by its collision with error.").
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correcting itself and withstanding certain accidents, such as a shortage in a
commonly consumed item."0
Nowhere in On Liberty does Mill attempt to make the case for "free
conduct," nor does he give more than passing consideration to the grey area
of speech-related conduct. Speech-related conduct refers to situations in which
an actor's speech clearly indicates a plan of action, a threat or an encourage-
ment to act that will have an immediate affect on someone else's conduct."
Mill's theory implies at least one clear boundary between speech and
conduct: government can and should regulate speech-related conduct that has
harmful external effects. However, Mill does not specify how government
should regulate this harmful conduct. He seems indifferent as to whether
government should rely on liability rules that create incentives for private indi-
viduals to enforce constraints on this conduct, or whether government should
rely on public officials to enforce command and control statutes that specify
the range of lawful conduct. Note, though, that Mill's discussion of education
suggests that he prefers private activity over state monopolies," and this may
indicate that he would prefer private enforcement through liability rules, but
Mill is never explicit about this point. Pigou's theory of externalities provides
a strong theoretical backing for using damage payments or fines rather than
command and control statutes. 3 Despite the fact that Mill also uses a theory
of externalities as a basis to distinguish permissible and impermissible regula-
tion, Mill does not express a preference for private enforcement over command
and control statutes.
One might argue that almost anything an individual does can be consid-
ered conduct that has a harmful external effect, and that therefore government
is free to regulate almost all speech-related conduct. 4 For example, I may be
harmfully affected by the knowledge that the man across the room from me
is listening on his earphones to racist propaganda, even though I cannot hear
it myself. Similarly, someone might be offended by another person's choice to
flip through a pornographic magazine. Consider also how geographic differenc-
es further complicate these problems: an activity that generates harmful
external effects in New York City, may be perfectly acceptable in the open
spaces of rural Wyoming. If "harmful externality" is defined by the sense of
a New Yorker, then the residents of rural Wyoming will find themselves
straightjacketed by regulations that seem entirely inappropriate.
Mill's answer to the first problem, the possibility that certain thoughts or
literature may have a harmful effect on another, is implicit in his argument to
protect free speech. When the state prevents an individual from listening to
10. Id at 60-61.
11. Id at 53 ("[E]ven opinions lose their immunity when the circumstances in which
they are expressed are such as to constitute their expression a positive instigation to some
mischievous act.").
12. Id at 103-106.
13. A.C. Pigou, The Economics Of Welfare (Macmillan, 4th ed 1948).
14. R.P. Anschutz, The Philosopby Of J.S. Mill 48 (Oxford, 1953).
[3:35
Mill's Theory of Liberty 39
music with racist lyrics, it invades the region of thought in which individuals
should be free to roam without restriction. But surely, one might protest,
society cannot be expected to be completely open-minded on every idea. For
example, why should society be forced to endure the argument that blacks or
Jews were born to be slaves? Mill's argument is that we can reject this
proposition only because we are free to test the hypothesis against our own
observations. But again, one might question why we should provide so much
freedom to each individual to test and retest propositions that have been
proven false. Why not simply have the matter settled by a scientific panel and
then require beliefs to conform with the result? Mill would argue that the
responsibility to determine truth lies not with a panel of experts, but with each
individual. Unless individuals are free to exercise this responsibility, society
would never acquire the variety of experiences that diversifies our knowledge.
Mill considers regional variation in the way individuals perceive harmful
behavior as an issue that society resolves through the development of
norms.'- Conduct that has a harmful external effect, according to Mill, is
conduct that harms others because it violates implicit contracts that govern
social interaction." For example, operating a slaughterhouse would have
harmful external effects in New York City, but probably not in a rural area
of Wyoming. Local norms expand the set of expectations, and these expecta-
tions are a form of property. The fact that such norms influence legal rules is
apparent in nuisance law, which has long held that an activity that may be a
nuisance in one area may not be in another. 7
It should be clear that the state cannot be free to dictate norms itself."8
For example, if the state could simply ban the operation of slaughterhouses in
rural Wyoming by declaring a local norm against such businesses, then Mill's
theory would be empty. That is, if the state is free to declare the norms that
define Mill's notion of a harmful externality, then the state's power to regulate
individual behavior would be unlimited. Although Mill is never explicit about
this point, it is clear that when he refers to norms generated by society, those
norms are not dictated by the state. Axelrod, for example, has recently
described how cooperative norms develop independent of the state, 9 but this
notion of a norm can be traced to Hume, if not earlier.2" Thus, for Mill's
15. See, generally, Mill, On Liberty at 73-91 (cited in note 2).
16. Similarly, Mill consistently holds that a "wrong" that justifies punishment is an act
that is harmful and violates accepted norms. Under Mill's framework, certain acts are
"inexpedient" in the sense that they reduce total welfare, but because they do not violate
an accepted norm, they should not be met with punishment. See, for example, Mill, On
Liberty at 73 (cited in note 2). For a discussion of this distinction, see David Lyons,
Human Rights and the General Welfare, 6 Phil & Pub Aff 113, 119-20 (1977). See also,
C.L. Ten, Mill On Liberty 56-61 (Oxford, 1980); J.C. Rees, A Re-Reading of Mill on
Liberty, 8 Pol Stud 113, 115-16 (1960).
17. Ensign v Walls, 323 Mich 49, 34 NW2d 549, 553 (1948).
18. See, for example, John Gray, Mill On Liberty: A Defence 90 (Routledge, 1983).
19. Robert Axelrod, The Evolution Of Cooperation (Basic Books, 1984).
20. For a discussion of Hume's theory of norms concerning property, see John
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argument to make sense, the state's ability to define norms must be limited to
the process envisioned in classical common law theory.2 Courts or other
agencies of the state reach out to understand the norms that implicitly govern
individual behavior, and then adopts those norms as law.
In Mill's framework, then, the implicit contracts that govern social interac-
tion define a set of ideal norms. The norms in this set maximize welfare and,
in a perfect system, they would converge with the norms embodied by law.2"
I noted earlier that Mill's theory of externality is quite different from the
modern version, commonly attributed to Pigou.23 Under Pigou's theory, a
harmful externality is anything that affects the utility of an actor and operates
outside the price system. In Pigou's framework, the fact that a slaughterhouse
emits smells that cause discomfort to the random passerby in rural Wyoming
creates a harmful externality. But this is not an externality in Mill's theory.
Today, economists are generally trained under Pigou's framework, and they
have largely failed to notice that these different notions of externality exist.2 4
For example, the Pigouvian framework inevitably leads scholars, such as
Calabresi," to argue for a rule of strict liability in tort. However, Mill's defi-
nition of externality leads to recommendations which are generally consistent
with the common law of torts.
The different approaches Pigou and Mill employ with respect to harmful
externalities corresponds to the different approaches they take towards utility
maximization. Pigou's notion of internalization-that is, shifting every external
cost to its original source-maximizes utility in the following sense. If every
harm is shifted to the individual who is the source, then each individual will
take an action that causes harm when and only when the private benefit to the
Plamenatz, The English Utilitarians 34-36 (Oxford, 1949).
21. William M. Blackstone, 1 Commentaries On The Laws Of England 63-92
(Chicago, 1979).
22. One criticism of Mill's framework that should be addressed here is the claim that
it is circular or leads to an infinite regress. See Hart, Essays On Bentham at 92-93 (cited
in note 1). The infinite regress argument is as follows: punishment is justified under Mill's
framework only if the injurer commits a moral wrong, and the injurer commits a moral
wrong only if he violates a norm, and he violates a norm only if punishment is justified.
As Hart points out, we should be able to determine whether an action is a moral wrong
without having to determine whether punishment is justified. Hart, quite appropriately in
my view, does not place a great deal of weight on this criticism. The circularity argument
is based on a simplistic interpretation of Mill. A more appropriate chain is as follows:
punishment is justified if the action is a moral wrong, and it is a moral wrong if it
violates a moral norm. A moral norm may be embodied in the law, or may not be. The
standards which justify punishment are not necessarily equivalent to moral tests of
appropriateness.
23. See note 13.
24. I am indebted to Andreas A. Papandreou for this observation.
25. Guido Calabresi, The Costs Of Accidents: A Legal and Economic Analysis (Yale,
1970). For a critique of Pigouvian-based tort theory, see Keith N. Hylton and Steven E.
Laymon, The Internalization Paradox and Workers' Compensation, 21 Hofstra L Rev 109-
182 (1992).
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individual exceeds the harm imposed on others. Harms will of course occur;
but they will all maximize welfare. The overall sum of utilities will be greater
if the harms are allowed to occur, than if the government prevents the harms
through regulation. Mill, though, rejects this approach because it is inconsistent
with the development of a secure base of expectations.
Consider, for example, the regulation of pornography. Suppose A's
decision to flip through a pornographic magazine generates a private gain of
ZA dollars for A (after converting units of utility to dollars) and a correspond-
ing loss to B of ZB dollars. Under Pigou's theory, B should have a cause of
action against A to receive compensation for the harm. Liability will deter A
from reading pornography in the presence of B if and only if ZB > ZA (i.e., the
harm to B exceeds the gain to A). Mill's theory requires us to reject this
approach to regulation because it is inconsistent with the basic rule that
protects freedom of expression. Although the Pigouvian taxation or liability
system maximizes utility at the moment, it reduces welfare in the long run
because it destroys the reliability of rules that promote long run welfare. Under
Mill's theory, the long run welfare maximizing rule immunizes communicative
activity unless it takes on the features of an intentional tort. For example, if
A convinces B that he is gleefully flipping through a book filled with pictures
of the remains of some horrible accident in which B's children were killed, the
activity 6 should lose its immunity."
Beyond the fact that it ignores long run welfare, Pigou's theory also entails
a much higher cost of error. If the state attempts to regulate A's behavior on
the theory that it is making A into a better person, in A's own lights, then
error is the likely result. The state's definition of A's ideal may be far from
A's. Alternatively, if the theory of regulation is to prevent harm to others, or
to bring society up to its highest level, which may require a suppression of
certain types of people in order to promote more desirable characteristics, then
the problem of error is just as great. The system generates an endless list of
unresolvable claims of the general form "B's preferences should be given more
weight than A's."
26. The communicative activity I am referring to here combines both the act of
flipping through the book and the act of telling the parent. Flipping through the book,
considered independently, falls squarely within the region of protected activity under Mill's
theory. Telling the parent causes the activity to lose its immunity if it rises to the level of
an intentional infliction of emotional distress. The combination of the two acts makes it
more likely that the intentional tort label applies.
27. In addition, Mill's theory would support regulation of child pornography. First, it
reaches a level of general offensiveness such that the intentional tort analogy seems
applicable. Second, the presumption that children are not voluntary participants is entirely
appropriate. Any commerce in child pornography supports a form of slavery that is
inconsistent with any regime that protects freedom of thought and freedom to pursue
individual goals. Third, child pornography may incite readers to action. However, I am
reluctant to accept this argument because it relies on an empirically questionable assump-
tion, incitement to action, and could be used to justify regulation of any type of literature.
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II. Mill's Theory of Liberty and the Regulation of Hate Speech
I have described Mill's theory of speech and conduct regulation, and I now
apply that theory to the particular case of hate speech and hate speech-related
conduct. First, assume that actions can be placed in one of two catego-
ries-hate and non-hate-based on their effect. The hate category includes
speech and conduct that is intended, and generally does, have a harmful effect
on its target.28 An example of conduct in the hate category is murder; an
example of speech in the hate category is the threat "I will kill you!", provid-
ed that it is stated with sufficient credibility. Another form of hate speech is
an ethnic or racial slur that is directly aimed to isolate and humiliate a specific
target.29 The non-hate category includes conduct or speech that is not intend-
ed to have a harmful effect in the sense just described. While one might argue
that the distinction is hard to defend, society has already made it for us: we
all know what fighting words are, even though it would be impossible to list
them all here.
Mill's theory secures non-hate speech against state regulation, but it clearly
supports regulation of hate conduct. It is less clear what Mill's theory implies
about the area of hate speech-related conduct. I will refer to it below as "hate
conduct" even though I assume that it is speech-related. Since I assume hate
conduct includes a speech component, if the state regulates such conduct, it
creates a concern that in doing so the state will restrict freedom of thought.
However, Mill's framework provides a straightforward answer: the state can
regulate hate conduct. The reason is that hate conduct crosses the important
barrier between a "self-regarding" activity-that is, an activity that aims at and
affects oneself-and activity that primarily aims at and adversely affects the
recognized interests of others.
Of course, the question that concerns policymakers today is whether, based
on an actor's intent, we may increase the penalty on a certain type of conduct.
This would be a trivial question if it were simply a matter of examining
criminal intent. The criminal law has always made distinctions based on intent,
but the inquiry focuses on intent in the sense of intent to do the criminal act
itself.3" The more interesting question occurs when the actor's intent reflects
an expression that mixes hate and political opinion, such as "I killed him
28. I am adopting a broader definition of "hate speech" than in the introduction of
this Article.
29. Of course, I am excluding the case in which one member of ethnic group X
speaking to another member of the group shouts, "You dumb X!" For a review of the
literature on the harms caused by racial and ethnic insults see Delgado, 17 Harv CR-CL
L Rev at 133 (cited in note 3).
30. Clearly, one can draw a more careful set of distinctions. For example, consider the
difference between "reason X has intent to act" and "motivation behind reason X has
intent to act". But one can go on forever with ever more elaborate and arbitrary
distinctions. See Note, Hate is Not Speech: A Constitutional Defense of Penalty Enhance-
ment for Hate Crimes, 106 Harv L Rev 1314, 1321 (1993).
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because he is a member of a trade union." Under Mill's theory, can the state
assess a larger penalty against the killer whose motive is based on the victim's
political affiliation or ethnic group membership?
I think it is clear that the state can assess a larger penalty under Mill's
framework. There are two reasons. First, the killer clearly crosses the boundary
between self-regarding behavior to conduct that is aimed at and harms others
in violation of accepted norms. Second, once this boundary is crossed, there is
nothing in Mill's theory that prevents the state from trying to identify a more
dangerous group of actors on the basis of their expressed motivations."' The
state is free under Mill's theory to determine that someone who kills for
money is more dangerous than one who kills because he is awkward behind
the wheel of a car. It follows that the state is free to make distinctions among
killers based on their expressed motivations. One might argue that the state is
essentially creating new rules of law by punishing the politically motivated
killer more than another murderer. But the relevant law has already been
established: it is illegal to kill. The act of killing loses all claim to protection
from special regulatory burdens under Mill's theory because it crosses the
boundary between self and other regarding action. Once this important
boundary is crossed, the state is free to assess penalties in any way that
enhances its ability to effectively enforce its laws. In punishing the politically-
motivated killer more harshly, the state merely varies the penalty according to
a perception of the social danger created by the underlying group. 2
Mill remarks that "George Bramwell murdered his uncle to get money for
his mistress; but if he had done it to set himself up in business, he would
equally have been hanged." 3 This and the examples that Mill follows it with
might be interpreted as an argument that when the state punishes an actor, it
should never take the actor's motivation or thoughts into account. This,
however; would be to misunderstand Mill. For Mill, the murder is a necessary
condition for punishment. Mill did not erect the other- versus self-regarding
distinction as a barrier to prevent the state from examining motivation. Indeed,
31. Mill, On Liberty at 96-97 (cited in note 2) ("The right inherent in society to ward
off crimes against itself by antecedent precautions suggests the obvious limitations to the
maxim that purely self-regarding misconduct cannot properly be meddled with in the way
of prevention or punishment.").
32. It is easy to see why individuals who injure others on the basis of hate might be
more dangerous than others, or why special effort should be directed toward deterring
hate crimes. A member of one race is more likely to be the target of criminal activity if
he is in an area dominated by another race. The criminals will rationally calculate that
their chances of getting away with the crime are higher, because the outsider will not
know the offenders and probably will not know anyone who knows the offenders. In
addition, given a choice of victims, the offenders would prefer to attack the outsider. They
know that the chances are slim that they are related to the outsider and they may experi-
ence some utility in committing what they perceive as an attack on the outsider's race. Fi-
nally, if the enforcement authorities are of the same race as the offenders, the offenders
may believe that they will be treated leniently if they are apprehended.
33. Mill, On Liberty at 79 (cited in note 2).
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with respect to many actions it is difficult, if not impossible, to determine
whether it is self- or other-regarding without taking motivation into ac-
count. 34 Once the necessary condition for punishment is satisfied, any util-
itarian would have to approve of a plan that uses information on motivation
in a manner that makes deterrence more effective.
There are two remaining categories of speech and conduct that we must
consider: non-hate, speech-related conduct and hate speech. By non-hate,
speech-related conduct, I mean conduct that is speech-related but is not aimed
at hurting another person by violating legal or socially-recognized interests. For
example, someone who burns the United States flag in order to protest the
federal government's actions is engaged in non-hate, speech-related conduct.
Here, as noted earlier, Mill's framework suggests that if the conduct is aimed
at hurting others and does so, then the state can regulate that conduct. Here,
though, the definition of harm must be sensible in light of the social norms
that govern. The state does not have a free hand to regulate in this area unless
an individuals conduct clearly crosses the boundary between hurting others and
affecting oneself. It follows that the state cannot regulate the flag burner,
because the flag burner crosses the boundary just about as far as someone
who reads (entirely to himself) racist literature in front of a person who would
be offended by it. We accept the notion that someone can burn something that
belongs to him under certain conditions. For example, no one would be
concerned over a neighbor's decision to burn a pillowcase in order to protest
the actions of a linen manufacturer. The flag burner is viewed in the same
light since he is doing something to or with his own property. We would have
a different case if the burning emitted fumes that caused discomfort to neigh-
bors, or if the flag were property of the government that it temporarily
allowed individuals to hold.
Hate speech is the most difficult area because it is speech, and therefore
invokes freedom of expression concerns. The important question here, as in all
other cases, is whether it crosses the boundary between self-regarding and
other-regarding action.3" This is entirely a matter of norms or conventions. If,
given existing norms, the speech at issue is unambiguously hate speech, then
34. Alan Ryan, John Stuart Mill at 245-49 (Random House, 1970).
35. Mill applied this boundary to speech as well as conduct. Mill, On Liberty at 53
(cited in note 2). One can arrive at interesting contradictions by toying with the "self
versus other" distinction while ignoring the norm-violation requirement. Consider, for
example, the several marches Martin Luther King led through areas populated by large
numbers of violent racists. One could argue that this was "other-regarding" activity that
should have been prohibited by the state. By the same reasoning, an individual who walks
alone in a high-crime area should be punished, or at least denied access to the state's
enforcement offices, if he becomes the victim of a crime. By provoking criminals, his
action was other-regarding. My inclination is to dismiss these examples as unworthy of se-
rious consideration, but they reflect a deeper criticism. Pigouvian externality theory is quite
consistent with the claim that some crime victims should be denied access to the state's
enforcement offices because some criminal activity is entirely foreseeable. Mill's framework
requires us to reject this approach because it encompasses a reliance on social norms.
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it can be regulated. Since it is speech, it is important that the state recognizes
norms in a manner that creates a presumption that the state will not restrict
speech. There must be freedom for individuals to adopt different lifestyles,
which may involve different ways of speaking. For this reason, any effort to
regulate hate speech obviously implicates Mill's concerns about freedom of
thought. However, Mill's theory provides no justification for an absolute ban
on efforts to regulate hate speech.
One might argue that it is difficult to identify existing norms (or "socially
recognized interests"). However, the norms that would be relevant in the hate
speech area are embodied in our criminal codes. Most states have code provi-
sions governing assault, disorderly conduct, threats, harassment, and intimida-
tion.36 The rules, and the case law interpreting these provisions reflect norms
adopted by the relevant community. Thus, a hate speech regulation would be
consistent with Mill's theory if it required enhanced penalties for violating a
code provision governing harassment when the injurer's aim is to coerce an
individual because of that individual's race, religion, ethnic group or political
affiliation.
It is necessary to define these permissible norms; otherwise, hate speech or
hate conduct regulation would degenerate into a series of self-serving efforts by
various ethnic or racial groups to regulate the speech of others. Indeed, ethnic
or racial interest groups'would attempt to force others to meet their definitions
of ideal speech and conduct. Such an approach would be inconsistent with
Mill's theory because the aim of such regulation would be, in effect, to force
others to meet an ideal rather than prevent injury.
The discussion of the flag-burner example may have obscured the extent
to which the implications of Mill's framework differ from modern interpreta-
tions of constitutional law. Courts and commentators emphasize the distinction
between speech and non-speech, but the important distinction is between self-
regarding action and other-regarding action that violates social norms. This
distinction makes sense on utilitarian grounds, and accords with common
intuition. Someone who credibly communicates to a parent that he has just
killed that parent's child inflicts a great deal of harm, even though it is
nothing more than speech. The aim of regulation should be to minimize harm,
not to protect an abstract doctrine. Current courts and commentators are
preoccupied with the search for the fixed set of fundamental values that
underlie the constitution's efforts to protect expression. As a result, they
disregard real pain. The search for fixed values generates a version of what
Karl Popper referred to as the "paradox of freedom."37 The paradox, in this
context, is as follows. The state should not regulate speech because it restricts
the individual's freedom of thought. However, by refusing to regulate, the state
36. Where these laws have not been codified, these activities remain prohibited by the
common law of the state.
37. Karl R. Popper, 2 The Open Society and its Enemies: The High Tide of a
Prophesy: Hegel, Marx and the Aftermath 44 (Princeton, 5th ed 1966).
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gives bullies the freedom to suppress the expression of others. A theory must
be able to specify the line between too little and too much regulation. Free
speech and free thought theories, with their respective emphases on fixed
categories of speech and on freedom of thought as an overriding principle, are
incapable of doing this. Mill's theory, however, conceptually draws the line in
a clear manner and at the right point.
III. Flawed Arguments Against Regulation of Hate Speech and Hate
Conduct
My claim that hate speech and hate conduct (that is speech-related) can be
regulated runs against some highly regarded arguments in the literature. I
consider three of them in this section. First, I consider the argument that
regulation of hate speech and hate conduct restricts freedom of thought.
Second, I discuss the argument that regulation of hate speech and conduct is
inconsistent with the values of democracy or, more generally, of an open
society. Third, I consider the analogy to anti-discrimination laws.
A. FREEDOM OF THOUGHT
Perhaps the strongest argument against regulation of hate speech and hate
conduct is that it restricts freedom of thought by singling out certain thoughts to
be punished more severely than others.38 It is typically noted that hate conduct
statutes do not criminalize conduct that was not already criminal.39 The statutes
only punish certain conduct more severely when accompanied by certain
thoughts. Hence, the statutes regulate thought.
Although the argument seems to be rooted in Mill's theory, it is fundamen-
tally inconsistent with the utilitarian premises of Mill's framework. The question
this argument begs is why we should make protecting freedom of thought an
overriding principle in the design of a regulatory system.
Under Mill's theory we should protect freedom of expression, and freedom
of thought to the extent possible, because by encouraging free movement in the
realm of thoughts we benefit in identifiable ways. In order to discover the
"truth," individuals must be free to accept or reject any hypothesis concerning
reality, however absurd. Confidence that a given hypothesis is true is a function
of the ease with which individuals can falsify that hypothesis and therefore a
function of free expression as well. Moreover, diversity in beliefs fostered by free
expression is a source of strength because it generates conflicts that increase
knowledge.
The state should protect freedom of thought as long as it remains within
Mill's notion of self-regarding activity. Once an individual's action crosses the
38. See Susan Gellman, Sticks and Stones Can Put You in Jail, But Can Words In-
crease Your Sentence? Constitutional and Policy Dilemmas of Ethnic Intimidation Laws,
39 UCLA L Rev 333, 362-63 (1991).
39. Id at 343.
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boundary between self-regarding and other-regarding activity, the argument for
an absolute ban on state intervention weakens considerably. For one is free to
have beliefs and to express those beliefs, but to do so in a manner that harms or
coerces another is hardly a necessary element in freedom of thought. The benefits
generated by protecting freedom of thought do not require the state to relax its
laws against injuring others. Nor does the goal of protecting freedom of thought
require the state to remain neutral with respect to motive when it enforces laws
to regulate action that injures others.
The fundamental problem with freedom of thought as an overriding principle
is that it is indeterminate: it can be raised as both a criticism and a defense of
laws that regulate hate speech or hate conduct. For example, freedom of thought
can be used to defend regulation in the following way. Laws that regulate hate
speech and hate conduct deter those who aim to silence others. A law that
punishes someone who kills a trade union member aims, in part, to deter those
who would attempt to forcibly prevent trade associations. If the state punished
that kind of murderer more harshly than others, it would show the state's
particular concern to protect the freedom of association of potential union mem-
bers.
Further it seems quite plausible that some regulation of hate conduct or even
hate speech would actually promote freedom of thought and tolerance. For
example, if the state chooses not to raise the penalties for individuals who join
racist mobs, I find it hard to see how the state, by doing so, protects freedom of
thought. After all, the kind of mob behavior recently observed in Germany is
hardly an expression of free thinking." Some of the participants may reflect on
their actions in a cooler moment and realize that they were inappropriate. If, by
raising penalties for racist mob activity, the state can lead potential participants
to think about and reconsider their actions, the state will enhance freedom of
thought and tolerance to everyone's benefit.
B. TOTALITARIANISM
Some argue that regulation of hate speech and hate conduct smacks of
thought control and therefore threatens the core values of a democratic society.
A totalitarian government cannot remain in power if its "citizens" are free to
circumvent its authority. A crucial step in a totalitarian state's effort to preserve
its own stability is an effort to suppress criticism of the state, views that are not
officially sanctioned, or any market exchange outside of the state's control. These
40. Ferdinand Protzman, Music of Hate Raises the Volume in Germany, NY Times Al
(Dec 2, 1992) (reporting surge in popularity of racist music in Germany); 2 Germans
Admit Arson Attack That Killed 3 Turkish Nationals, NY Times A10 (Dec 2, 1992)
(describing confessions by men who firebombed house killing a Turkish grandmother and
two girls); Stephen Kinzer, Racist Attack on Americans Upsets Germany, NY Times A8
(Nov 2, 1993) ("fighting broke out after a group of about 15 skinheads appeared at a
discotheque and began shouting racist insults at an American athlete"); Germans Protest
Bombing, Cin Enquirer A13 (Mar 27, 1994) (Neo-Nazis firebomb a synagogue).
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forms of suppression were central to Plato's utopian state, detailed in The
Republic.4 They protected citizens from falling under the spell of false doctrines
and they protected citizens from chasing monetary goals and sacrificing opportu-
nities for real improvement (or self-realization). 42 Although Plato restricted only
the guardian class from participating in the market on these grounds,43 it should
be clear that some leveling would be required under Plato's government in order
to prevent some of the non-guardians from amassing enough wealth to compete
with the state as a source of power and influence.
Regulation of speech and speech-related conduct threatens the values of an
open society because it is one step along a path that leads eventually to thought
control. Today, the state protects certain minority groups from harmful speech
and conduct. Tomorrow, the state introduces regulations that require individuals
to adhere to "correct" doctrines. The interests of the state then assert themselves
more aggressively in the regulatory scheme, until a system that began as an effort
to protect politically-weak minority groups blossoms into full-blown thought
control.
This view misses the point. When the state regulates hate speech and hate
conduct, its purpose is to protect dissent and the expression of views, or life-
styles, that differ from those of the majority. The totalitarianism concern is
important, and hate speech regulation certainly forces us to take it into consider-
ation. However, regulation may reflect an opposing concern that hate speech
should not receive tacit support or subsidization from the state. While the
totalitarianism critique is based on a picture of the state as nightwatchman, the
regulatory effort is motivated by the notion of a state that has "gone fishin,"'
and simply refused to protect certain citizen groups from harm.44
Just as totalitarianism is not merely a theoretical issue, the concerns that
have motivated proponents of regulation are not entirely theoretical. Consider
the position of blacks in the period of Jim Crow government in the southern
United States. The local governments were formally racist in the sense that they
actively enforced racist statutes. But they were also informally racist, in the sense
that local justice authorities refused to use their resources to protect black
citizens from whites. Indeed, the Klan and local lynch mobs were effective
because they operated at times as an informal, underground government,
imposing a level of control on black citizens that would have been entirely
inconsistent with the laws and the basic freedoms enshrined even in southern
state constitutions. It obscures the reality of that period to describe it as merely
private activity,4" because it often received the blessing of the state, though
41. Plato, The Republic of Plato 108-111 (Oxford, 1945) (Francis MacDonald
Cornford, trans).
42. Id.
43. Id at 108.
44. This concern underlies one view of the Second Amendment. See Robert J. Cottrol
and Raymond T. Diamond, The Second Amendment: Toward An Afro-Americanist Recon-
sideration, 80 Georgetown L J 309 (1991).
45. Richard A. Epstein, Forbidden Grounds: The Case Against Employment Dis-
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perhaps never openly. Purely private racist force could not have been as effective
as it was in the South without the acquiescence of local authorities.
One simple solution to the general problem of a state that refuses to apply
its law evenhandedly is a set of rules that raise the penalties on private parties
that try to take advantage of the lapse in enforcement in order to coerce,
oppress, or expropriate the property of groups that are likely to be left unpro-
tected during the lapse. Such laws could be viewed as "automatic stabilizers" for
a democratic regime." Thus, the state would protect dissent or divergence from
the majority lifestyle precisely when that dissent most urgently needs protection.
C. ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAW ANALOGY
Some critics of hate speech and hate conduct regulation argue that it is quite
different from regulation of employment discrimination. The difference, accord-
ing to the critics, is that Title VII and other anti-discrimination laws aim at the
external effect, not the motivation of the actor.47 An employer who fires a
female employee because he believes females are less productive will have
violated Title VII just as surely as one who fires a female employee because of
his distaste for the presence of women in the workplace. Critics assert that this
emphasis on external effect is not a characteristic of hate speech and hate
conduct regulation. The fact that there is difference between, intentional discrimi-
nation and cases of disparate impact does not change the argument. An employer
may intentionally discriminate without having any bad feelings about women in
the workplace. He intentionally discriminates as long as he aims to fire a
woman, even if the only reason is that he believes women are more expensive or
less productive than men.
It is surprising that this argument has met with such apparent success.4" The
flaw is that hate conduct regulation also aims to control behavior that has an
external effect against a certain group, regardless of the real motivation. For
example, someone who kills a black person because he thinks blacks are a
crimination Laws 91-115 (Harvard, 1992).
46. Economists often refer to the tax and transfer system as an automatic stabilizer be-
cause the level of welfare payments increases during periods of recession, minimizing the
harm of an economic downturn, and the relative tax burden increases during periods of
growth, reducing the risk of inflation.
47. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 USC §S 2000e-2000e-17 (1988). Of course, this
theory has never been asserted or accepted by the Supreme Court or any other court. In
U of Pa v EEOC, 493 US 182, 195-202 (1990), the Court rejected a claim that the First
Amendment insulated the defendant from the application of Title VII, but the Court did
not rely on the broad theory that Title VII steers clear of influencing the injurer's
motivations. Because defendants have been unable to show that their ability to determine
the content of their speech requires freedom to discriminate on the basis of race or sex,
courts have rejected claims that Title VII interferes with freedom of expression. See, for
example, Hausch v Donrey of Nev, Inc., 833 F Supp 822, 832 (D Nev 1993).
48. For a presentation of the argument by a distinguished constitutional law scholar,
see Martin H. Redish, Freedom of Thought as Freedom of Expression: Hate Crime
Sentencing Enhancement and First Amendment Theory, 11 Crim Just Ethics 29 (1992).
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greater drain on society's resources is presumably just as guilty of violating a
hate conduct regulatory statute as one who kills a black because he hates blacks.
Instead, the attempt to distinguish hate crime regulation from
antidiscrimination legislation generally reveals a deeper problem in the attempt
of critics to cast hate crime legislation as an unconstitutional assault on the First
Amendment. The Carolene Products49 theory of the equal protection clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment suggests that its purpose is to protect politically-
weak minority groups, whose interests would otherwise be ignored by a state
that caters to the preferences of the majority. The Fourteenth Amendment
authorizes Congress to pass laws for the purpose of enforcing its provisions.
Hate crime legislation is entirely consistent with the prevailing view of the
purpose of the equal protection clause, and probably more so than Title VII.
While Title VII aims at private behavior, hate crime legislation is, at least
arguably, directed toward the state. It provides additional support to weaknesses
in law enforcement and weaknesses in the dispensation of benefits that are likely
to result in any state whose offices fail to mirror the racial, ethnic, or religious
composition of their jurisdictions.
Of course, it is would be impossible for any government in a diverse society
to ensure that its offices perfectly match the diversity of its citizens, and it would
take the most aggressive affirmative action program to even try to comply with
such a goal. But this merely strengthens the case for laws that place checks on
the ability of local justice authorities to ignore the interests of minorities. To the
extent that hate conduct and hate speech legislation serve this purpose, they are
entirely consistent with the framework of antidiscrimination laws.
IV. Some Applications
I have presented Mill's framework as a normative theory of regulation. Thus,
it would not concern me greatly if speech doctrine were entirely inconsistent with
the framework. However, the most prominent free speech decisions seem to be
consistent with the framework, except for one recent and glaring exception, the
R.A.V v City of St. Paul0 decision. Here I briefly discuss the four categories of
speech and speech-related conduct identified in Section I and how they compare
to current first amendment doctrine.
A. UNCONTESTED TERRITORY
Two of the categories are entirely consistent with Mill's framework. Non-
hate speech enjoys first amendment protection and there seems to be little
controversy about this point. While the Supreme Court has emphasized freedom
of thought concern in justifying its decisions, its decisions can be squared equally
and indeed somewhat more easily with the utilitarian framework suggested in
this Article. Take for example, the celebrated West Virginia State Board of
49. United States v Carolene Products Co, 304 US 144, 152-153 (1938).
50. 505 US 377 (1992).
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Education v Barnette"t decision, in which the Court held that the state could
not, while remaining consistent with the constitution, require a school child to
pledge allegiance to the flag. Whether one wants to view the decision as pro-
tecting freedom of expression or freedom of thought, it is important to note that
the school child's conduct was a self-regarding activity in Mill's framework.
Under Pigou's theory of externalities, one might take the position that the refusal
to recite the pledge causes external harms because some school official might be
insulted or embarrassed by the child's silence. Indeed, it might reduce overall
utility because the school teacher's disutility may exceed the school child's benefit
from silence. But external harms are not defined so liberally in the framework of
this Article. In order for the harm to justify regulation, it must violate an ac-
cepted norm. We have long accepted the right of an individual to treat his own
speech and indeed his own thought as a form of property. He does not commit
a trespass by speaking his mind about an issue, except perhaps in the case of
shouting "fire" in a crowded theater. It is instead understood to be an invasion
of property for A to attempt to control B's speech.
The category of non-hate conduct also seems consistent with Mill's frame-
work. United States v O'Brien2 informs us that regulation of non-hate conduct
meets constitutional standards if it furthers an important and substantial govern-
mental interest, and the incidental restriction on expression is no greater than
necessary to further that interest. This is consistent with Mill's framework, but
it poses unavoidable and intractable problems when viewed through the "free-
dom of thought" lens.
Consider the facts of O'Brien. A young man who burned his draft card was
convicted under a federal statute prohibiting destruction of Selective Service
certificates, and the Supreme Court upheld the conviction."s Under the frame-
work of this Article, the decision is easy to understand because the draft card
was never understood to be the private property of the young man; like a
driver's license, it was evidence of a form of registration that was understood to
be at least partially public property. It would be more difficult to carry out the
draft if individuals were free to treat the relevant certificates as private property.
The potential external harm of the young man's conduct was significant.
Although I have already discussed flag burning it may be helpful to compare
O'Brien with the famous flag burning case, Texas v Johnson.s4 If someone buys
a flag from a store, it is generally understood to be the property of the purchas-
er, and in the absence of unusual harms to bystanders the owner is free to do
what he wishes with the flag. And that is apparently what the Court held.
While the notion that freedom of thought should be the overriding concern
is consistent with Texas v Johnson, it seems contrived to apply this rationale to
51. 319 US 624, 642 (1943).
52. 391 US 367, 376-77 (1968).
53. O'Brien, 391 US at 386.
54. 491 US 397, 420 (1989) (holding that the arrest of a political protestor for
publicly burning the American flag is an unconstitutional violation of the First Amend-
ment).
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justify the O'Brien decision. If freedom of thought is an overriding principle, it
would seem that the administrative concerns of O'Brien are trivial in compari-
son. A driver's license might make a stronger case for suppression of expression
because unlicensed motorists may injure or kill other drivers. But if the
government's need to make sure that you hold on to your original draft
card-and not just a copy of it--can trump all free speech concerns, then the
freedom of thought principle is anything but overriding.
B. CONTESTABLE TERRITORY
The current doctrine on two categories discussed above-hate speech and
hate conduct-are not consistent with Mill's framework for regulation. This is
largely due to the Supreme Court's R.A.V. decision.
Consider hate speech regulation first. Before R.A.V., it was understood that
fighting words enjoyed no protection under the first amendment."5 One would
have thought that this meant that the state could regulate them in whatever
manner it saw fit, without violating the First Amendment. However, R.A.V.
rendered this view incorrect. R.A.V. held that the state cannot constitutionally
regulate fighting words unless it regulates all fighting words in the same man-
ner. 6 That is, the state cannot create a law that singles out a particular subset
of fighting words for unusually large penalties.
Before R.A.V., the fighting words doctrine was consistent with Mill's theory.
The use of fighting words is by definition an other-regarding activity. Since this
activity involves speech, courts should demand that the state's regulation meet
high standards to ensure that the regulation does not simply silence an unpopular
group. The standard, here, is whether under prevailing norms, the regulation
restricts speech that clearly causes or threatens to cause immediate and signifi-
cant harm. If the state meets this standard, then the state's use of this regulation
is consistent with Mill's framework.
The sweeping doctrine announced in R.A.V., though, is clearly inconsistent
with Mill's theory. Under Mill's framework, the state is free to regulate fighting
words "unevenly" as long as it regulates only fighting words. The reason is clear.
Some fighting words are more dangerous or more hurtful than others. It would
not require a study by an expert, for example, to safely conclude that someone
who carries a banner emblazoned with a swastika and spouts virulently
antisemitic rhetoric in the presence of a holocaust survivor inflicts an injury as
palpable to the victim as a punch in the face.
Consider the passage in which Mill himself makes the case that fighting
words are an exception to idea of protecting free expression:
An opinion that corn dealers are starvers of the poor, or that private
55. Fighting words are words "which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to
incite an immediate breach of the peace." Chaplinsky v New Hampshire, 315 US 568,
572 (1942).
56. R.A.V., 505 US at 386.
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property is robbery ought to be unmolested when simply circulated through
the press, but may justly incur punishment when delivered orally to an
excited mob assembled before the house of a corn dealer, or when handed
about among the same mob in the form of a placard. 7
Suppose that the probability of a riot at the corn dealer's house is p, where p is
sufficiently high that the speech loses its immunity under Mill's theory. Suppose
further that by merely adding the statement "corn dealers of race X are well-
known starvers of the poor, and this corn dealer is an X," the probability of a
riot at the corn dealer's house is increased substantially. Then a law that sets a
higher penalty on the speaker in the latter case would only deter a more harmful
form of unprotected speech.
Of course, there are troubling issues raised by regulation in this area. How
do we really know that the victim of the racist invective was a holocaust survi-
vor, instead of a touchy fellow looking for a fight? How do we know that the
speech directed to him was "virulently antisemitic"? These are problems that
make regulation troublesome, but they do not justify a general ban on all efforts
to regulate hate speech or hate speech-related conduct.
The statute at issue in R.A.V illustrates the difficulties that arise in trying to
write legislation that satisfies the standards suggested by Mill's framework. The
ordinance provided that:
Whoever places on public or private property a symbol, object, appellation,
characterization or graffiti, including, but not limited to a burning cross or
Nazi swastika, which one knows or has reasonable grounds to know
arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race, color,
creed, religion or gender commits disorderly conduct and shall be guilty of
a misdemeanor."8
Justice Scalia found the ordinance offensive to first amendment values because it
"license[d] one side of a debate to fight free style, while requiring the other to
follow Marquis of Queensbury rules." 9 In Mill's framework, though, this is not
the most important concern. Indeed, it is not of any importance provided that
the ordinance regulates fighting words. The troubling feature of the ordinance in
Mill's framework is that it does not clearly regulate fighting words. Words may
cause "alarm or resentment" without being fighting words. Thus, even under
Mill's framework the ordinance in R.A.V is impermissible.
R.A.V threw open, for a brief period, the question of whether the constitu-
tion permits the government to increase penalties on criminal conduct motivated
by racial, ethnic, or political biases. The Supreme Court answered this question
affirmatively in Wisconsin v Mitchell.0 The defendant in Mitcbell was part of
57. Mill, On Liberty at 53 (cited in note 2).
58. R.A.V., 505 US at 380.
59. Id at 392.
60. 113 S Ct 2194 (1993).
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a group of black men and boys who, after discussing a scene from the movie
Mississippi Burning, decided to "move on some white people."6 ' They beat a
fourteen-year-old white boy so severely that he remained in a coma for four
days.62 Mitchell was convicted of felony aggravated battery and his sentence
was increased from two to seven years under the Wisconsin hate crime penalty-
enhancement statute.63 Although the broad language of R.A.V. would seem to
require the Court to hold Wisconsin's penalty-enhancement statute unconstitu-
tional, the Court distinguished the statute as applying to conduct rather than
speech.64
Although the result in Mitchell is consistent with Mill's theory, when taken
together, the doctrines of R.A.V. and Mitchell are unsatisfactory from a utilitari-
an perspective. These cases create rigid categories-speech and conduct-that
yield very different treatment for the constitutionality of hate speech and hate-
crime penalty-enhancement legislation. In many cases, the line separating speech
and conduct is entirely unclear. The doctrine articulated in these cases will,
predictably, generate efforts to evade penalty-enhancement by arguing that the
defendant's action was really speech, even though it shares some of the features
of conduct. However, from a utilitarian perspective, the important distinction is
not between conduct and speech; it is between self-regarding and other-regarding
activity. Under Mill's framework, penalty-enhancement is permissible as long as
the activity falls in the latter category and harms the socially-recognized interests
of others.
It is easy to observe the difference between Mill's framework and current
Court doctrine by looking at the most frequently reported category of hate
crime: threats, intimidation, and harassment." When the offender's conduct
clearly violates a relevant criminal statute, Mill's framework suggests that the
state can prescribe enhanced penalties with respect to hate offenses. R.A.V., on
the other hand, holds that the constitutionality of enhanced penalties in this area
remains in doubt.
One might argue that the current speech-conduct distinction is superior to
Mill's framework because it is administratively less burdensome. However, this
defense is utilitarian in nature, and is therefore off-limits to those who criticize
hate speech regulation on freedom of thought or other non-utilitarian grounds.
Further, the speech-conduct distinction employed by R.A. V. and Mitchell is itself
administratively burdensome.66 The doctrinal refinements these decisions engen-
61. Id at 2196.
62. Id at 2197.
63. Id.
64. Id at 2200-01.
65. See The Association of State Uniform Crime Reporting Programs and the Center
for Applied Social Science Research, Northeastern University, Hate Crime Statistics, 1990:
A Resource Book 50 (Department of Justice, 1992). New York recorded 1130 offenses,
the largest sample of hate crime incidents reported in 1990. Of those incidents, 508 (45
%) were incidents of harassment.
66. The evidence is starting to pour in now. Compare, for example, United States v
Hayward, 6 F3d 1241 (7th Cir 1993), and United States v Lee, 6 F3d 1297 (8th Cir
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der will eventually lead to a level of complexity that is no simpler than what
would have emerged if the Court had used Mill's framework as a starting point.
V. Some More General Problems
Although it is not my aim to survey the first amendment literature, I feel
compelled to note that first amendment theorists have generally misunderstood
Mill. They often cite Mill's work as a source of their thoughts and then proceed
to spin out a theory that is entirely inconsistent with Mill's ideas. Perhaps the
best illustration of this tendency is an essay by R. George Wright that attempts
to define a set of "Millian values" that describe the scope of first amendment
protection. 7 If there is anything that should be clear about Mill, it is that his
work cannot be used to define certain, fixed "values" that enjoy first amendment
protection."8 The important boundary is between self-regarding and other-
regarding conduct. Any effort to define the content of speech that falls within the
self-regarding boundary is very likely to fail.
I do not wish to single out Wright for criticism, because the most prominent
first amendment theorists have taken an approach that is indistinguishable from
his. Mieklejohn, Bickel, Bork, and of course many others have attempted to de-
fine a type of speech that falls within the First Amendment. 9 These
essentialist70 notions of the right of free speech may be internally consistent, but
they cannot be squared with Mill's theory, and I doubt that they can ever serve
adequately as positive theories of the case law.
The prevalence of essentialist theories is easy to understand. The sense that
utilitarianism is inconsistent with any notion of fundamental rights is intuitive.
Bentham, by merely asserting this position ("nonsense on stilts!"), gave it an
apparently solid theoretical mantle. H.L.A. Hart has argued that Mill failed in
1993). Both cases involve statutes prohibiting cross-burning, but reach different outcomes.
Influenced by the broad language of R.A.V., courts are in the process of developing
narrow distinctions between permissible and impermissible statutes.
67. R. George Wright, A Rationale from J.S. Mill for the Free Speech Clause, 1985 S
Ct Rev 149.
68. See, for example, Ten, Mill On Liberty at 136 (cited in note 16).
69. Alexander Mieklejohn, Free Speech and Its Relation to Self-Government 94
(Harper, 1948) (distinguishing speech implicating public welfare from speech implicating
private goods); Alexander M. Bickel, The Morality Of Consent 62 (Yale, 1975) (distin-
•guishing speech central to the political process); Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and
Some First Amendment Problems, 47 Ind L J 1, 26 (1971) (distinguishing "explicitly and
predominantly political speech").
70. I use the term "essentialist" in the same sense as Karl Popper. Popper, The Open
Society at 5-8 (cited in note 37). The essentialist view of science is that it is an effort to
understand the core or essential forms of things that are observed. Essentialism in law is
the effort to understand legal doctrine by reducing it to a set of core principles that are
stable. For example, the Langdellian approach to understanding case law, which required
the scholar to reduce the law in an area to a set of basic principles, is an example of
essentialist science in law. See Mark F. Grady, Toward a Positive Economic Theory of
Antitrust, 30 Economic Inquiry 225, 226-27 (1992).
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his attempt to provide a utilitarian justification for such fundamental rights as
free speech, and that any such effort must fail.7 Modern scholars who study
Mill carefully seem to accept this fundamental inconsistency argument.72
However, developments in utility theory demonstrate that the fundamental
inconsistency is not as clear as Hart and other scholars would have us think.
Strotz was the first to demonstrate the problem of time-inconsistency, 3 which
provides a rigorous foundation for utilitarian rules.74 Consider the problem of
generating the greatest stream of tax revenues from taxing capital. The govern-
ment should set a rate that encourages, rather than discourages, capital forma-
tion. But in the short run, once the capital stock is in place, the government can
increase its revenue by raising the tax rate on capital. This is not the long run
optimal policy. In order to prevent government from seeking short run gains, it
should be forced to follow a rule that maximizes long-run utility.
Mill seemed to be aware of the time-inconsistency problem. In several parts
of his work, he refers to his interest in maximizing welfare in the long run."
Mill offered an additional reason for adopting rules that focus on the long run:
the likelihood of error when the state implements a discretionary policy can be
so great, that utility is ultimately maximized by forgoing short term discretionary
decisions.76 Mill argued that the likelihood of error is greatest when government
attempts to regulate individuals in order to improve them, or bring them up to
a standard of excellence, rather than simply prevent them from hurting others in
violation of society's norms.
My point is not that time inconsistency and error suggest that utilitarian
rules should be applied inflexibly, but that they clearly give these rules more
stability than a theory that requires the instantaneous maximization of pref-
erences at all moments. This is all that is required of a utilitarian theory of rules.
71. Hart, Essays On Bentham at 94-104 (cited in note 1).
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VI. Conclusion
While economists have applied their theories to many areas of regulation,
they have been reluctant to venture into constitutional law. Several reasons can
be offered for this, but an important one is the superficial tension between
utilitarian methods and the notion of fundamental rights. In place of
consequentialist theories, essentialist doctrines based on certain "core" principles,
such as the inviolability of freedom of thought, have dominated the field. Since
judicial decisions twist these principles when they apply them, modern constitu-
tional law scholarship seems to consist largely of criticisms of court decisions as
violations of principle.
This Article provides an alternative to the essentialist approach by construct-
ing a framework for speech regulation based on Mill's theory of liberty. Since
Mill's theory readily explains some the most controversial recent Supreme Court
decisions, Mill's framework offers hope for a positive theory of speech doctrine.
However, the greater part of this Article examines the implications of Mill's
framework for regulation of hate speech. While that framework does not suggest
that the state should have a free hand to regulate hate speech, it does suggest
that the state should have more freedom than prevailing free speech theory and
recent constitutional doctrine would suggest. Specifically, in cases where speech
violates criminal code provisions governing harassment, threats, and intimidation,
Mill's theory implies that a state should be free to enhance penalties for hate
speech.
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